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While the weak corporate governance has been identified as among the leading 
contributing factors that led to the Asian financial crisis, the progress in restructuring 
corporate governance has been rather modest in Southeast Asia following the crisis. 
Some common features of corporate governance in Southeast Asian countries, such as 
high concentration of ownership and lack of adequate disclosure, have been remarkably 
resilient to the frustration of the reformers.  In this paper, we argue that the observed 
rigidities in corporate governance structure in Southeast Asia may be due to the political 
institutions as well as the interaction between these institutions and the corporate 
sectors. Our analysis also finds that there are substantive variations in corporate 
governance across Southeast Asian countries, and that the differences in political 
institutions among these countries may account for much of the variations. 
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The “Asian model” of economic development,  once hailed as the engine for the 
unprecedented economic growth in East and Southeast Asian countries, has been under 
heavy scrutiny following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In particular, the impacts of 
corporate governance structure on the crisis have received a great deal of attention in the 
literature.  Evidences show that, at the macro level the weaknesses in corporate 
governance added to the vulnerability to the exchange rate depreciation and stock 
market collapse (Johnson, Boone and Friedman, 2000), and that at the firm level the 
ineffective corporate board, weak internal control and lack of adequate disclosure led to 
excessive exposure to debts (ADB, 2001). The governments in the region have responded 
decisively to these criticisms. Malaysia’s new Code of Corporate Governance requires 
one third of board members in the public listed firms be independent; the Security 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) requires that financial information from listed companies be 
conformed to the International Accounting Standards. Similar measures have been 
undertaken in other countries throughout the region.  
Despite of these efforts, however, the progress in reforming corporate 
governance in Southeast Asia has been rather modest. Ownership concentration remains 
at a high level (WSJ, 2003), new regulations are yet to be transpired to the real change in 
corporate behaviors, and there is even a perception that the quality of corporate 
governance has actually declined (Claessens and Fan, 2003). The resistances to the 
reforms indicate that there might be some rigidities in corporate governance in 
Southeast Asia. The existence of such rigidities may hamper firms’ abilities to alter their 
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corporate governance practices in responding to either the changing economic 
conditions or governmental directives.  
Such rigidities can be looked upon in light of the current debate over corporate 
governance convergence.  The proponents for convergence argue that globalization 
(Hansmann and Kraakman 2001) and stock market competition (Coffee, 2002) will force 
the corporate governance systems in different countries to converge to an  international 
norm. The opponents, however, claim that culture, legal tradition, and history have all 
played important role in the evolution of the corporate governance, and that corporate 
governance at the national level will continue to diverge in the future due to path 
dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). For those scholars, the sources of the rigidities in 
corporate governance stem from factors such as culture, legal tradition, history, and path 
dependence.  
In this paper, we focus on the complementarities between political institutions 
and corporate governance to explain the rigidities in corporate governance.  Corporate 
governance is concerned with the allocation of power, privileges and economic benefits 
among some of the most influential groups—such as investors, shareholders, mangers 
and employees—in any political system, and the relative strengths of claims made by 
these groups are often dictated by institutional factors such as party politics or electoral 
system. In addition, politicians and governmental officials often have vested interests in 
existing corporate governance structure, as they derive various resources from the 
corporate sector. Corporate governance reforms that would alter the existing resource 
allocation are likely to be resisted in the political system. Last, even if the alternative 
corporate governance structure may benefit the firms in the long-run, the firms may not 
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have incentives to change their current practices as these practices may represent the 
best response to the existing political environment. For example, firms may resist the 
demand for more transparency as doing so could potentially increase the chances of 
extortions by corrupted officials in an environment where corruption is pervasive.  
While the prevailing political institutions are among the key determinants in the 
evolution of the corporate governance,  corporate sector is not merely a passive 
participant in the political system. In fact, business elites can be involved in the politics 
in various capacities in order to secure and advance their interests. Political institutions 
and corporate governance structure mutually reinforce each other and become mutually 
dependent of each other. Such a mutual dependence may not only explain why 
dominant corporate government structure is persistent over time, but also in part 
account for the difficulties in reforming political institutions.  
Understanding the linkage between political institutions and corporate 
governance has several important implications in practice. First of all, a corporate 
governance reform agenda that neglects the impacts of political institutions fuel 
unrealistic (high) expectation of what the reform can achieve. Political institutions 
determine the formation and quality of the corporate governance, and thus changes in 
corporate governance are likely to come out slowly and the outcome muddled if the 
existing political institutions remain unchanged.  Second, understanding the role of 
political institutions in determining the corporate governance actually broadens the 
strategies and measures at the disposal of the government because the changes in 
political systems can effectively improve the prospects of the success of corporate 
governance reforms. Third, the complexity between the corporate governance and 
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political institutions imply that governments need to have a corporate governance 
strategy in dealing with the priority, scheduling and options of various reform 
initiatives in areas such as privatization and deregulation.   
In this paper, we focus on the corporate governance practices in five Southeast 
Asia countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and 
their relationship to the key characteristics of political institutions in these countries. The 
unique political and economic landscape of Southeast Asia presents an ideal setting for 
such a comparative study. There are striking similarities in corporate governance if 
comparing with countries in other region as a group, but the differences across these 
countries are also substantial.  
The paper will be organized as followed. In the next section, we compare the 
corporate governance practices in the five Southeast Asian countries, and then present 
some stylized facts  about the similarities and differences across these countries. In the 
third section, we discuss theories that link corporate governance with political 
institutions and examine their relevance in the context of Southeast Asia.  In the fourth 
section, we conclude our analysis by pointing out some key policy lessons for the 
reformers in the region in designing and implementing corporate governance reforms. 
 
Comparing Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia Countries: Stylized Facts  
Since Southeast Asian countries display striking similarities in corporate 
governance structure, they have often been treated as a whole group in the literature; 
however, considerable differences do exist across these countries. Both the similarities 
and the differences form the building blocks of our analysis. This section draws heavily 
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from some recent research conducted at international organizations such as the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank.  
 
Ownership Concentration  
Table 1 shows the ownership concentration for corporations in the five Southeast 
Asian countries. Three measures are presented to show the robustness of the results. The 
first one is the average percentage of shares owned by the insiders of corporations (the 
managers, directors and controlling shareholders). High concentration of insider 
ownership may raise the agency costs for outsider shareholders as it increases the risk of 
the expropriation of outsider shareholders by the insiders.  The second and third 
measures show the percentage of shares owned by the largest one shareholders and 
largest five shareholders, respectively.   All three measures consistently point to a trend 
that the ownership concentration is high in Southeast Asia. For example, In Indonesia 
the insiders own about 70% of the shares in the public-listed companies and the largest 
shareholders own roughly half of the equity stakes in the companies. On the other hand, 
regional variations are not insignificant—the average percentage of shares owned by the 
largest shareholders in Thailand is 30% as compared to about 50% in Indonesia.  
While corporate ownership is indeed highly concentrated in Southeast Asia, it is 
nevertheless not a distinctive Southeast Asian phenomenon. In fact, La Porta et al. (1999) 
argue that dispersed corporate ownership as found in the US and UK is an exception 
rather than the norm, even in the developed world.  For example, both France and 
Germany have high concentration of ownership, and the percentage of shares owned by 
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corporate insiders are 62.6% and 68.1%, respectively (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love, 
2000).  
The high concentration of ownership also should not be perceived as inferior to 
low concentration of ownership. Some empirical evidence from Asia and elsewhere even 
suggest the exact opposite. For example, Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) report 
that firm value is higher when the largest owner’s equity stake is larger, and Joh (2003) 
finds that firm’s accounting performance is positively related to ownership 
concentration. These findings are consistent with the principle-agent theory, which 
suggests that agency costs would be higher in the dispersed ownership than in the 
concentrated ownership.  
However, ownership concentration in Southeast Asia does open the door for 
some corporate governance practices that are potentially harmful. High ownership 
concentration has facilitated the separation between ownership and control and the 
family dominance in Southeast Asian economies.  It is over these practices some 
interesting and important patterns of variations have emerged across Southeast Asia.  
 
Separation between Ownership and Control 
Following the definitions used by La Porta et al. (1999), we define ownership as 
cash flow rights, and control as voting rights. Voting rights may deviate from cash flows in 
firms with high concentration of ownership because the controlling shareholders can use 
various mechanisms such as pyramiding and cross-holding to enhance control. The 
separation between ownership and control raises the agency costs for minority 
shareholders as their rights may be expropriated by the controlling shareholders (the 
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entrenchment effect).  Table 2 shows that expropriation of minority shareholders is 
widespread in Southeast Asia.   
The first column shows the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights, indicating 
that the separation of the ownership and control occur more frequently in Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The second column compares the uses of pyramid structures2 
and crossing holdings3 in Southeast Asia. The uses of pyramid structures and crossings 
are prevalent in Malaysia (39% and 15%) and Singapore (55% and 16%); while the 
pyramid structures occurs most frequently (67%) among corporations in Indonesia, the 
uses of cross holdings are relatively rare in that country and the pattern is similar for 
Philippines. The figures also suggest that the separation of ownership and control occurs 
the least frequently in Thailand.   
The last column in Table 2 indicates the percentage of the managers who are 
affiliated with the controlling shareholders (family ties or otherwise). For 85% of the 
firms in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as about 70% of firms in Singapore and 
Thailand, the control and management are not separated. The only exemption is 
Philippines, but Tan (1993) attributes it to the fact that many Philippines corporations 
have interlocking directorates and management boards. The high percentage of the 
affiliated managers suggests that the use of professional managers has not been a 
standard practice in Southeast Asia.  
 
2 Defined as owning a majority of a stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock of 
another, a process that can be repeated a number of times (Claessens, Djankov, and Fan, 2002).  
3 Defined as a company further down the chain of control has come shares in another company in the same 
business group(Claessens, Djankov, and Fan, 2002).. 
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The adverse effects of the separation between ownership and control on the 
value and performance of the firms are reported by a number of recent studied. The 
separation of ownership and control lowers firms’ value (Lins, 2003), and decreases their 
financial performance (Yeh, Lee and Woidtke, 2001).   
 
Family Dominance and the State Control 
  Another key feature of corporate governance in Southeast Asia is the dominant 
role of family businesses in the economy. Table 3 shows the distribution of control 
across Southeast Asia. Companies are divided into widely-held and with ultimate 
owners, and five ultimate owners are presented: family, state, widely-held financial 
corporation, and widely-held non-financial corporations. In comparison to firms in East 
Asia, widely-held firms are rarity in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Philippines. 
Families control the majority of the public listed firms in Indonesia (72%), Malaysia 
(67%), Thailand (62%) and Singapore (55%).  In Philippines, where relatively high 
percentage of firms are widely-held (19%) compared to its Southeast Asia neighbors, the 
share of family-controlled firms is still the highest (45%) of all types.   
Perhaps a more striking feature of corporate governance in Southeast Asia is the 
concentration of economic power in extremely small number of families. Table 4 shows 
the percentages of the capitalization in the stock exchanges in these economies are 
owned by one, five and ten largest families. In Indonesia and Philippines,  the largest 
families control 17% of the total market capitalization, and the largest 10 families control 
over 50% of the total market capitalization! Substantial regional variations do exist 
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across the five countries. For example, in Singapore and Malaysia, the largest 10 families 
control about a quarter of the total market capitalization, very close to the level in Korea.  
The dominance of families in the corporate sector in Southeast Asia presents 
some special challenges for corporate governance. First of all, it may amplify the 
problems caused by the separation of ownership and control in a vicious cycle of 
pyramiding controls and family dominance: pyramiding controls strengthen the family 
dominance which affords them an increased capacity to engage in more pyramiding 
controls. Second, the family control subjects the minority shareholders to a sets of 
risks—such as intra-family disputes and exploitation of some family members by 
others—which are  absent in firms that are not controlled by families (Morck, 2004). 
Third, the high concentration of economic power in the handful of families adds to the 
vulnerabilities to the overall macroeconomic environment, because decisions made by a 
handful of business elites—private in nature—may lead to disastrous consequences to 
the whole economy for which they cannot be held accountable. 
In addition to high concentration of family control, another noticeable feature in 
corporate governance in Southeast Asia is the important role played by state-controlled 
corporations, although the degree of importance varies greatly from country to country, 
as shown in Table 4.  Singapore has the highest share of the state-controlled corporations 
(24%), followed by Malaysia (13%), Indonesia (8%) and Thailand (8%).  The only outlier 
in this group is Philippines, where the share of state-controlled is merely 2%, similar to 
Japan and Korea.  
 
Corporate Governance Performance 
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While certain characteristics of the corporate governance, such as family 
dominance or corporate control through pyramiding and cross-holding, expose minority 
shareholders greater risk of being exploited by the insiders, it is overly simplistic to 
assume that there exits an one-to-one relationship between the structural characteristics 
of corporation corporate and their actual performance. Therefore, we have added the 
corporate governance performance as a separate dimension in comparing the five 
Southeast Asian countries.  
The importance of measuring the corporate governance performance has been 
recognized by a number of countries in the region. For example, in Thailand a corporate 
governance rating agency has been established to provide corporate governance rating 
services to companies listed in SET; in Singapore, Business Time has started to issue its 
corporate governance rating for some leading companies in Singapore. Several 
international consulting firms, such as  PricewaterhouseCooper, McKinsey & Company and 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), have also began their coverage of corporate 
governance measure at either the country or firm level.  
The corporate governance rating by CLSA is selected as the benchmark of our 
analysis for several reasons. The first is that it covers all five Southeast Asian countries 
included in our analysis.  The second reason, perhaps more important, is that it 
embraces a broader definition of corporate governance instead of narrowly focuses on 
the protection of shareholders. For example,  “social awareness,” referring to the 
company’s emphasis on ethical and socially responsible behavior, has been a component 
of their corporate government rating.  The third is that it combines both the subjective 
responses as well as objective measurement in their rating. For example, the rating on 
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independence of the board of directors for a particular company not only reflects the 
analysts’ opinion but also is based on an actual investigation of the relationship between 
the directors and the controlling shareholders. Table 5 shows the corporate governance 
ratings for the five Southeast Asian countries. 
There are substantial variations in the quality of corporate governance measured 
by the ratings across different countries. Singapore is consistently rated the best in the 
region in all of these categories except for accountability and social awareness, and 
companies in Indonesia perform the worst in corporate governance over almost all 
categories.  The weighted overall scores are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 also demonstrates the correlation between corporate governance ratings 
and share price performance. While the dramatic fall in share price reflects the 
devastating effects of Asian financial crisis, which in part due to poor corporate 
governance in some Southeast Asian countries, it indicates that the investors have 
clearly recognized the importance of corporate governance and adjusted their valuation 
accordingly.   
A number of questions emerge from our comparison of corporate governance in 
Southeast Asia. Why are so few companies widely held in Southeast Asia? Why are 
family businesses so dominant? Why the concentration of family businesses in the 
economy vary greatly from country to country? What are the implications of the 
extremely high concentration of family businesses in the economy?   Why do countries 
perform so differently in corporate governance ratings even though similar corporate 
governance structure is in place? If some features of the corporate governance structure, 
such as family dominance and low transparency, are proved to be harmful to the 
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investors, why have they been persistent for so long? And why are the structural 
characteristics of the corporate governance so resilient despite the tremendous efforts 
devoted to the reforms?  
In the next section, we show that the analysis based on the linage between  
political institutions and corporate governance may provide some plausible answers to 
these questions.   
 
Linking Political Institutions and Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia 
A clear definition of political institutions is in order as the term might mean 
different things for different people. We define policy institutions broadly as to include 
constitutional structures, political party systems, regulatory arrangements, various 
forms of public-private linkages, and informal rules and constraints govern political 
interaction. Political institutions influence corporate governance through structuring the 
incentives of  the demand and supply in the political marketplace for a particular type of 
corporate governance regime. 
 
Veto Power and Coalition 
Much of the politics is concerned with the allocation of power, and this is where 
we launch our inquiry of the linkage between political institutions and corporate 
governance. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the preference over different ownership 
concentration levels rest on the ability of a government to make credible commitment to 
maintain a regulatory regime to protect private investment. Highly concentrated 
ownership will be more likely if the government cannot credibly commit to its claims 
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because concentrated ownership gives the investors more flexibility to deal with the ex 
post shifts when the government behaves opportunistically4. What type of political 
system do a better job in preventing government from behaving opportunistically?  
The number of veto players matters. Beck et al. (2001) explain that a political 
system with multiple decision makers may offer greater protection from arbitrary 
government to individuals and minorities. Hall and Soskice (2001) report that, when the 
number of veto players rises, the dispersed ownership becomes more likely.  
Another important dimension of the investor protection is policy implementation, 
because governments’ ability to take actions decisively also matters. Asian financial 
crisis is a good case in point when both policy credibility and decisiveness are both 
essential. In contrasting the policy failures in Thailand and Indonesia during the Asian 
financial crisis, Andrew MacIntyre (1998) writes: 
“The institutional problems in Thailand and Indonesia were quite different, but 
ultimately produced the same outcome—massive loss of investor confidence. Where 
Thailand suffered policy paralysis as a result of weak multiparty parliamentary 
government, Indonesia suffered from almost the opposite set of institutional 
circumstances: massive centralization of  power which left government vulnerable to deep 
problems of credibility due to unreliable policy commitments. Thailand’s system of 
government suffered from too many veto points and Indonesia suffered from too few.” 
The key is that institutions such as multiple veto players have to be coupled with 
coalition with breath and depth to guarantee the implementation of policy. Hicken and 
 
4 Haber, North and Weingast (2003) argue it is almost intrinsic for governments to engage in such 
opportunistic behavior as they are often confronted with many, and often conflicting, objectives, in dealing 
with the corporate sector.  
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Ritchie (2003) define the coalitional breath as “the number of different interests 
represented in the coalition, such as labor, business, landholding elites, peasants, and at 
time civil service,” and coalition depth as the level and extent of participation.” Table 7 
shows how the five Southeast Asian Countries would fall into the typology developed 
by Hicken and Richie.  
Table 7 shows the challenges facing countries in Southeast Asia in promoting 
dispersed ownership in the economy. Concentrated veto power undermines policy 
credibility in Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, while in Thailand, dispersed veto 
power coupling with shallow-narrow coalition leads to frequent gridlock of decision 
process. This explains why the ownership concentration has been so high in Southeast 
Asia, and unless significant changes in the political system can be expected, business 
owners would not be keen to giving up their controlling shares. Figure 1 shows the 
results from World Business Environment Survey, and original question asks the firms 
“do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws or regulations 
which materially affect your business?” The results are generally consistent with the 
typology developed by Hicken and Bryron (2003). Most business owners in Singapore 
believe that the government is capable of making credible commitment to their 
approaches while two thirds of business ownership in Indonesia think that unexpected 
changes in rules, laws and regulations are likely.  
 
Vote Buying and Money Politics 
Several Southeast Asia countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand have made some significant progress towards democratization in recent years. 
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Both the electoral politics and electoral process have undergone changes of paramount 
importance to corporate governance reforms. Callahan (2000) reports that election in 
many Asian countries often requires huge amount of resources because of the 
widespread practices of vote-buying. If this holds true, then increased electoral 
competition resulting from democratization may reinforces the family dominance in 
economy, as families are best poised to supply with the much needed resources to the 
system—money, network and politicians. In addition, the involvement of family 
businesses in politics helps to solve the free-rider problem normally associated with the 
political contribution. 
Party politics and electoral system in Thailand offer an interesting example. Most 
Thai parties are loosely structured groups of factions, and don’t have the national 
network, and as a result, there is no long tradition of mobilization and organization at 
the local level. Parties have to rely on vote-buying to obtain the support at the local level. 
In addition, because the cabinet position is awarded on the number of the Members of 
Parliament (MPs) a faction leader controls, MP-buying is also a widespread practice. 
During the 1996 general election, it is estimated that Bt 20-30 billion ( Wingfield, 2002) 
were spent on the election (campaigning, vote-buying, MP-buying). On the other hand, 
however, Thai’s parties don’t have mass base and thus cannot depend on membership 
subscriptions for funding party campaign ( Wingfield, 2002), and the chief mean for 
political parties to secure this level of funding is to through political patronage through 
their connection with the corporate sector. The vote-buying and party financing open 
the door for growing business participation. In 1992, 68% of the assemblymen were 
businesspeople. Callahan (2000) describes the nature of the growing business 
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participation and its relation to the politics: “political power allows them to firm up and 
expand their business activities, while income generated from business gives them 
access to business power.” 
The commercialization of Thai’s electoral gives the edge to family conglomerates 
to use their economic strengths to advance their interests because their size gives them 
some comparative advantages in the competition for political power. On February 9, 
2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, the richest man in Thailand, was appointed prime minister of 
Thailand. His party—Thai Rak Thai—a single party presenting the interests of business, 
won 41% of the votes. Commentators believe that with the direct access to power, the 
wealth will be even more concentrated in just a few families and “narrow rather than 
broadening opportunities in the Thai market place (Far Eastern Economic Review 
4/1/2001)”. 
The rise of the Thai family conglomerates in the political arena may have been an 
extraordinary case. However, money politics in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
have been well documented (Callahan, 2000; Eklof, 2002; Gomez, 2002) and vote-buying 
has also been reported for Indonesia and the Philippines.  Campaign financing provides 
an important venue for the family conglomerates to further their economic power by 
securing rent-seeking arrangements from politicians who demand financial 
contributions. Ironically, policies designed to roll back the state involvement in the 
economy, such as privatization and deregulation, have bred the “new rich” who are not 
to be outdone by the old ones as new group of family conglomerates have emerged from 
newly deregulated and privatized sectors in the region.  
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Quality of Regulatory Environment and Corruption 
The corporate governance reform is a regulatory reform in nature, and just as 
any other type of regulatory reforms, the ability of the government to implement the 
rules and regulations will depend on the quality of regulatory environment. Table 8 
shows the linkage between the quality of the regulatory environment and the 
compliance of corporate governance rules across Southeast Asia.  
There are discrepancies between the rules and their implementations for all five 
countries with varying degrees. Malaysia has very tough corporate governance rules 
and regulations, but the enforcement is of very poor quality. The regulatory 
environment of the five countries measured by rule of law, the protection of property 
rights and competence of public officials are also of law quality, with the exception of 
Singapore, where all rankings are considerably higher than other Southeast Asia 
countries. It is clear that that regulatory environment is not up to the task to implement 
the corporate governance standards—which are low to start with in several countries—
and that poor regulatory environment leads to poor quality of enforcement.  
Theorists have postulated several explanations. La Porta et al. (1999) show that 
countries with poor legal and regulatory environment  are likely to have concentrated 
ownership. This is because both the state and individual owners can enforce property 
rights, and enforcement by individual owners (in the form of concentrated ownership 
and family businesses) will gain more importance in the absence of effective 
enforcement by the state. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that the concentration of 
ownership becomes dominant as large shareholders cannot sell out in a low quality 
regulatory environment because becoming a diversified passive investor in other firms 
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is simply not a viable alternative. Morck and Yeung (2004) claim that family ownership 
and groups will become dominant choice of the institutional arrangements based on the 
theory of transaction costs: the transaction costs among family members and closely 
affiliated corporations will be lower, because they face a lower degree of information 
asymmetry problems. The last column in Table 8 shows the high level of concentration 
by family businesses does seem to correspond to the quality of regulatory environment.  
Focusing the incentives of the corrupted officials, Morck and  Yeung  (2004)  
argue  that  family  pyramids  are  preferable trading partners for corrupt politicians.  
Family firms are more likely to return past favors because of a longer continuity of 
management. Being involved with a few families instead of a large number of firms also 
could reduce the chances of being exposed because politicians only need to deal with 
only a few patriarchs.  In addition, families controlling pyramids are more able to come 
up with side payments because they are able to pay by expropriating minority 
shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 2004).Given the importance of the global fight against 
corruption, our analysis shows that reducing the level of corruption can decrease a 
country’s reliance on a small number of families and such benefits should be taken into 
considerations by the policy makers in designing the anti-corruption strategies.  
The existence of widespread corruption would potentially undermines the 
efforts in toughening the rules on corporate information disclosure, because firms that 
comply with the regulations might find them in a weakened position when deal with the 
corrupt officials. The accurate information reported by the firms can be used by the 
corrupted officials for increased level of extortions. Root (2001) points out that business 
transparency may be dangerous in the poor quality regulatory  environment because 
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firms that disclose profits can still be subject to arbitrary government audits and 
expropriations, and this forces the firms to internalized risks by maintaining a closed 
production system. In this case, firms might be discouraged to participate in the equity 
financing through listed in stock markets because of unreasonable high level of rules 
and standards.  
Figure 2 shows the occurrence of bribery activities reported by firms in the five 
countries based the World Business Environment Survey. The levels of corruption faced 
by the firms in some Southeast Asian are astonishing: 68% of firms in Indonesia and 79% 
in Thailand pay bribes to public officials on a regular basis! The size of the bribe is often 
substantial. Findings from the 2001 Indonesia national survey show that 27% of 
businesses reported paying over 10% of their companies’ total revenue as bribery. Smith 
notes that In Indonesia most bureaucrats took pungli payments (“informal tax) to 
supplement meager salaries, and the government expected this since it reduces the 
needs for more formal tax (Smith, 2001). 
The important dynamic effects of the relationship between quality of regulatory 
environment and the various characteristics of the corporate governance structure 
should be paid sufficient attention. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) discuss the 
possibility of the endogeneity of the legal systems, that is, the dominance of family 
business hampers the development of legal and regulatory environment as these firms 
have more resources to shape the government and they have vested interests in the 
continuation of the existing regulatory environment. 
 
Conclusion: Policy Lessons for Corporate Governance Reforms in Southeast Asia 
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Our analysis of the linkage between political institutions and corporate 
governance offers several important policy lessons for designing and implementing 
corporate governance reforms in Southeast Asia. First of all, the policy makers in the 
region should consider the differences in political institutions before they commit to a 
comprehensive set of reform measures that might be promoted as universally desirable. 
Different countries face different challenges in corporate governance based on how their 
corporate governance system matches up with the prevailing political institutions,  and 
thus would demand different set of solutions. Policies should be devised to reflect on the 
key features of the underlying political environment. Ignoring the relationship between 
political institutions and corporate governance significantly reduces the relevancy of the 
reform policies.  
Second, governments should not commit to a set of comprehensive reform 
measures prematurely because much of the real progress might depend on what 
happens to firms’ political environment.  Firms’ corporate governance practices are 
largely shaped by forces outside the corporate boardrooms. For example, there are little 
chance the adoption of international accounting standards would lead to high quality 
disclosure as long as both the firms and their political patrons have vested interests in 
defending the secrecy of the existing rent-seeking schemes critical for the survival for 
both. Tightening standards for listed firms prematurely can even backfire as firms 
contemplating equity financing may give up this option altogether if they are convinced 
that it is impossible to meet their these standards in the prevailing political environment.  
Third, our analysis of the importance of political institutions doesn’t mean that 
our choice set of reform measures are narrowed by any means. In fact, the scope of 
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effective measures for corporate governance can be broadened because a new set of 
instruments focusing on the firms’ political environment may now be at disposal of the 
reformers. For example, reducing corruption might decrease the incentives for the 
family conglomerates to further their territory.  In addition, while the fundamental 
changes in the political changes take time and are often outside the scope the reformers, 
they can position themselves in anticipation of the  arrival of favorable conditions. In 
many Southeast Asian countries, substantial changes in both political and economic 
institutions are taking place. Reformers should couple the strategies for good corporate 
governance principles with some changing characteristics in the political institutions. 
The recent surge of interests on political corruption, for example, offer important 
window of opportunity for make improvement in corporate governance issues such as 
bribery and information disclosure.  
On the other hand, however, ignoring the linkage between political institutions 
and corporate governance might not only lead to the waste of otherwise golden 
opportunities, but also aggravate problems. The experiences in public sector reforms 
such as privatization and deregulation in Southeast Asian provide some important 
examples. For example, while the original intention of the deregulation is to undermine 
the state’s regulatory discretion and to allow more competition in the marketplaces, 
what has happened in reality is the transfer of the public monopoly to the private hand 
which further strengthens the power of family conglomerates at the expense of 
weakened economy and risen inequality. It is crucial to put in place appropriate 
corporate governance structure to spearhead the process of public sector reforms in 
privatization and deregulation.  
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Data source: World Business Environment Survey, World Bank, 1999. 
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Figure 2: Bribery Payments






Frequently Sometimes Seldom Never
 
 
Data source: World Business Environment Survey, World Bank, 1999. 
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Table 1: Concentration of Ownership   
 
% of shares 
owned by the 
insiders*
% of shares owned 
by the largest top 
shareholder**
% of the shares owned 
by the largest five 
shareholders**
Indonesia 68% 48% 68%
Malaysia 50% 30% 59%
Philippines 55% 34% 60%
Singapore 55% - -
Thailand 45% 29% 57%
Japan 41% - -
Korea 29% 20% 39%  
 
Data source: 
*Himmelberg Charles P., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Inessa Love, Investor protection, 
ownership, and investment, Columbia University, 2000.  
**Asian Development Bank, Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia, 2001. 
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Table 2: Separation of Ownership and Control  
 
Ratio of Cash 







Indonesia 0.784 67% 1% 85%
Malaysia 0.853 39% 15% 85%
Philippines 0.908 40% 7% 42%
Singapore 0.794 55% 16% 70%
Thailand 0.941 13% 1% 68%
Japan 0.602 36% 12% 37%
Korea 0.858 43% 9% 81%  
 
Data source:  
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000) 81-112 
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Table 3: Control of the Public listed Companies 
 





Indonesia 5% 72% 8% 2% 13%
Malaysia 10% 67% 13% 2% 7%
Philippines 19% 45% 2% 8% 27%
Singapore 5% 55% 24% 4% 12%
Thailand 7% 62% 8% 9% 15%
Japan 80% 10% 1% 7% 3%
Korea 43% 48% 2% 1% 6%  
 
Data source:  
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000) 81-112 
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Table 4: Concentration of  Family Control 
 
Top 1 family Top 5 families Top ten families
Indonesia 4.09 17% 41% 58%
Malaysia 1.97 7% 17% 25%
Philippines 2.68 17% 43% 53%
Singapore 1.26 6% 20% 27%
Thailand 1.68 9% 32% 46%
Japan 1.04 1% 2% 2%





% of total market capitalization that families 
 
 
Data source:  
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000) 81-112 
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Table 5: CLSA Corporate Governance Ratings 
 
Discipline Transparency Independence Accountability Responsibility Fairness
Social 
awareness
Indonesia 36 57 22 21 34 53 37
Malaysia 49 63 67 38 52 70 60
Philippines 41 44 46 34 36 41 78
Singapore 56 67 81 45 70 76 54
Thailand 36 65 43 63 47 70 65  
 
Description of variables: 
Discipline—management’s commitment to emphasize shareholder value and financial 
discipline 
Transparency—the ability of outsiders to access the true position of the a company 
Independence—the board of director’s independence of controlling shareholders and 
senior management 
Accountability—the accountability of the management to the board of directors 
Responsibility—the effectiveness of the board to take necessary measures in case of 
mismanagement 
Fairness—the treatment of minority shareholders receive from majority shareholders 
and management 
Social awareness—the company’s emphasis on ethical and socially responsible behavior.  
 
Data Source:  
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 2001, Saints & Sinners: Who’s Got Religion? 
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Thailand 55 -41.9%  
 
Data Source:  
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 2001, Saints & Sinners: Who’s Got Religion? 
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Table 7: Veto Power and Coalition 
 
Broad-deep coalition Shallow-narrow coalition
Decisive Decisive
Policy stability Policy volatility




Decisiveness of difficulties Decisiveness difficulties









Source: Hicken, Allen and Bryron K. Ritchie, The Origin of Credibility Enhancing 
Institutions in Southeast Asia, 2003. 
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Law (out of 
10)
Property rights 








Indonesia 4                         2                         4 63 48 58%
Malaysia 8                         2                         7 33 65 25%
Philippines 5                         2                         3 53 58 53%
Singapore 9                         7                         10 6 1 27%
Thailand 7                         2                         3 37 44 46%  
 
Data source: 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 2001, Saints & Sinners: Who’s Got Religion? 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-2002 
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